FACTS:
This case arose after the EDSA revolution
when petitioners herein and others allegedly illegally intruded into the land
located at Lubao, Pampanga owned by Estrella Arastia. Thereafter, an agrarian
complaint was filed by Arastia which ordered the petitioners herein a writ of
preliminary injunction to desist and refrain from occupying the subject
property.
The
petitioners then filed a complaint against Arastia with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Petitioners cried for a writ of
preliminary injunction which was granted and gave them the right to resume occupation
and cultivation of the subject land. Having been granted the right to resume
occupation by the petitioners resulted in the dispatch of several policemen to
the area. They reminded petitioners of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
in the earlier case and ordered them to leave the land in dispute. Upon their
refusal to leave, the policemen arrested them and subsequently charged them
with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful order of persons in authority
before the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao. On the same day, they were released.
Insisting on their
right to work on the land in accordance with the writ issued in the DARAB Case,
the following day, petitioners again entered the land. Without a warrant of
arrest, herein respondent police officers arrested petitioners for having entered
the landholding and for resisting and intimidating said police officers. Recovered from petitioners' possession were
seven (7) assorted bolos used in cultivating the land.
Petitioners were
detained at the municipal jail of Lubao, Pampanga on October 8, 1992. On even
date, they were charged with direct assault upon agents of a person in
authority.
On October 21, 1992,
the Provincial Prosecutor filed an information for direct assault upon agent of
a person in authority before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga.
In fine, since at the
time the petitioners were arrested, the PNP team was enforcing a lawful order
of the same RTC and in seriously resisting the same the appellants intimidated
the PNP team committing the alleged crime of Direct Assault Upon An Agent of A
Person In Authority, a warrant was not necessary for their arrest, as provided
in Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;
In the light of the foregoing, the issue
regarding the validity of the four warrants of arrest issued against the
petitioners need not be taken up.
Let it also be stated that there is no
explicit rule requiring a judge, after an accused has been arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the regional trial court and later charged
in a complaint or information comformably with the provisions of Rule 112, Section
7 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to still issue a warrant of arrest or
order of commitment for the said accused (Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Gloria Jopson Asuncion [G.R. L-No. 84907, Minute Resolution, First Division,
November 3, 1988]). As explained by the Supreme Court, such rule is not
provided since the accused is already under detention so that the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest or an order for his commitment would be an absolute
superfluity, considering that the need of a warrant of arrest arises only when
the accused is at large as under Rule 113, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure means "the taking of a person in custody in order that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense," and that the
obvious purpose of the warrant is for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the arrest made by the police
officers supported by the writ of preliminary injunction from the agrarian
case, is valid.
HELD:
Petitioners are treading on shaky ground in
questioning the legality of their arrest in this petition for habeas
corpus for the reason that the police officers were enforcing a writ of
preliminary injunction illegally issued in the Agrarian Case, in the same
breath, allege that they could use force or "legally resist and even
intimidate another, be he a private individual or an agent of a person in
authority, who interferes with the legitimate exercise of (his) rights" as
possessors and cultivators of the Arastia property.
If indeed petitioners are tenants of the
Arastias under the law, they are not without other legal recourses.
Certainly, through their counsel, who appear to be zealous in protecting
whatever rights petitioners believe they may have, they should pursue the DARAB
Case and whatever actions are available for them under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Although it is
well-accepted that a court should always strive to settle the controversy in a
single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation, this rule cannot apply if the result would negate the rational
application of the Rules of Court. Petitioners may not engage in procedural
shortcuts to revive the settled issue of the validity of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in the Agrarian Case allegedly on the ground of
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties in the instant
petition for habeas corpus arising from their arrest for having
assaulted persons in authority.
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