G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.:

FACTS:

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

           He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

           The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”

            Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

           Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:

Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

          We disagree.

Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:

            Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

            Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis supplied)

            In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.  

          On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists.  If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. 

          Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.  

            However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”

       The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:

 Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

            Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:

 2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;

            Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

            SECTION 5.   Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

  Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”

  Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

            SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied) 

            After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. 

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1139. October 16, 1997 ROBERTO ESPIRITU, v. JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS DIGEST MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Roberto Espiritu, as complainant, alleged that at around 7:30 in the evening of July 16, 1994, while he was with a group which included Eulogio Pabunan, Arnel Guerra, Januario Peregrino, and Marcelino Bautista, Weny Dumlao approached him and fired at him three times, as a result of which complainant was wounded; that complainant was able to run away; and that Dumlao wanted to kill complainant because the latter had filed a case against Dumlao’s brother, Victor, for the murder of complainant’s son Rolly.

A criminal complaint for frustrated murder was filed against Dumlao to the respondent Judge’s court. After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the judge, he ordered the arrest of the accused and fixed the bail at P20,000.00. A few days later, the Judge reduced the bail at P10,000.00, stating the Dumlao’s father had asked for the reduction. Thereafter, he ordered the release of Dumlao and dismissed the case due to another pending case filed by Dumlao against Espiritu with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he reduced the bail of Dumlao.

HELD:

At the time the Honorable Judge acted on the “request” for reduction of bail, the accused was not under detention as he was not arrested nor had he voluntarily surrendered as borne by the records.  Accordingly, the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, so the Honorable Judge cannot act on such “request” for reduction of bail even if interceded by the father of the accused;

The amount at which the bail was reduced:  P10,000.00 is not commensurate with the gravity of the crime charged, an evident manifestation of the Judge’s injudiciousness in the exercise of his authority and discretion.  The bail bond guide of 1981 provides for the amount P12,500.00;

Apparently, therefore, when Dumlao applied for bail on September 7, 1994 to respondent judge, Dumlao was not in custody.  But although then not in legal custody, Dumlao subsequently submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court when on September 7, 1994 he personally asked respondent judge to admit him to bail and reduce its amount. Before the arrest warrant could be served on him, he filed through counsel a motion for admission to bail which the trial court set for hearing on November 5, 1992 with notice to both public and private prosecutors.  As Paderanga was then confined at a hospital, his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over Paderanga’s person to the chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and asked that, for purposes of the hearing on his bail application, he be considered as being in the custody of the law.  On November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00.  The next day, Paderanga in spite of his weak condition, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail.  He was arraigned and thereafter he attended the hearings. We held that the accused was in the constructive custody of the law when he moved for admission to bail through his lawyers (1) by filing the application for  bail with the trial court, (2) by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts, and (3) by unequivocably recognizing the jurisdiction of said court.

            The reduction of Bail was although unjust because the bail for frustrated murder as stated in the 1981 bailbond guide is fixed between P120,000.00 and P140,000.00, the penalty being reclusion temporal in its minimum period. (12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months)

G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975 LEONARDO ALMEDA v. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ DIGEST CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash.

At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda. Hence, the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty.

HELD:

As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.

Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.

But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner's past record, 7 the range of his career in crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. The likelihood of his jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry while on provisional liberty is a consideration that simply cannot be ignored.

Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution 8 "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."

G.R. No. 107741 October 18, 1996 FRANCISCO BERNARTE et al. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS et al. DIGEST ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:

This case arose after the EDSA revolution when petitioners herein and others allegedly illegally intruded into the land located at Lubao, Pampanga owned by Estrella Arastia. Thereafter, an agrarian complaint was filed by Arastia which ordered the petitioners herein a writ of preliminary injunction to desist and refrain from occupying the subject property.  

            The petitioners then filed a complaint against Arastia with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Petitioners cried for a writ of preliminary injunction which was granted and gave them the right to resume occupation and cultivation of the subject land. Having been granted the right to resume occupation by the petitioners resulted in the dispatch of several policemen to the area. They reminded petitioners of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the earlier case and ordered them to leave the land in dispute. Upon their refusal to leave, the policemen arrested them and subsequently charged them with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful order of persons in authority before the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao. On the same day, they were released.

Insisting on their right to work on the land in accordance with the writ issued in the DARAB Case, the following day, petitioners again entered the land. Without a warrant of arrest, herein respondent police officers arrested petitioners for having entered the landholding and for resisting and intimidating said police officers. Recovered from petitioners' possession were seven (7) assorted bolos used in cultivating the land.

Petitioners were detained at the municipal jail of Lubao, Pampanga on October 8, 1992. On even date, they were charged with direct assault upon agents of a person in authority.

On October 21, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an information for direct assault upon agent of a person in authority before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga.

In fine, since at the time the petitioners were arrested, the PNP team was enforcing a lawful order of the same RTC and in seriously resisting the same the appellants intimidated the PNP team committing the alleged crime of Direct Assault Upon An Agent of A Person In Authority, a warrant was not necessary for their arrest, as provided in Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

In the light of the foregoing, the issue regarding the validity of the four warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners need not be taken up.

Let it also be stated that there is no explicit rule requiring a judge, after an accused has been arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the regional trial court and later charged in a complaint or information comformably with the provisions of Rule 112, Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to still issue a warrant of arrest or order of commitment for the said accused (Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Gloria Jopson Asuncion [G.R. L-No. 84907, Minute Resolution, First Division, November 3, 1988]). As explained by the Supreme Court, such rule is not provided since the accused is already under detention so that the issuance of a warrant for his arrest or an order for his commitment would be an absolute superfluity, considering that the need of a warrant of arrest arises only when the accused is at large as under Rule 113, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure means "the taking of a person in custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense," and that the obvious purpose of the warrant is for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether the arrest made by the police officers supported by the writ of preliminary injunction from the agrarian case, is valid.

HELD:

Petitioners are treading on shaky ground in questioning the legality of their arrest in this petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the police officers were enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction illegally issued in the Agrarian Case, in the same breath, allege that they could use force or "legally resist and even intimidate another, be he a private individual or an agent of a person in authority, who interferes with the legitimate exercise of (his) rights"  as possessors and cultivators of the Arastia property.

If indeed petitioners are tenants of the Arastias under the law, they are not without other legal recourses. Certainly, through their counsel, who appear to be zealous in protecting whatever rights petitioners believe they may have, they should pursue the DARAB Case and whatever actions are available for them under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Although it is well-accepted that a court should always strive to settle the controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation, this rule cannot apply if the result would negate the rational application of the Rules of Court. Petitioners may not engage in procedural shortcuts to revive the settled issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the Agrarian Case allegedly on the ground of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties in the instant petition for habeas corpus arising from their arrest for having assaulted persons in authority.